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Belief in creationism and intelligent design is widespread and 
gaining in significance in a number of countries. This article 
examines the characteristics of science and of religions and the 
possible relationship between science and religion. I argue that 
creationism is sometimes best seen not as a misconception but as a 
worldview. In such instances, the most to which a science educator 
(whether in school, college or university) can normally aspire is to 
ensure that students with creationist beliefs understand the 
scientific position. In the short term, the scientific worldview is 
unlikely to supplant a creationist one for students who are firm 
creationists. We can help students to find their evolutionary biology 
courses interesting and intellectually challenging without their being 
threatening. Effective teaching in this area can not only help 
students learn about the theory of evolution but better to appreciate 
the way science is done, the procedures by which scientific 
knowledge accumulates, the limitations of science and the ways in 
which scientific knowledge differs from other forms of knowledge.
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“… discussion of religious beliefs between a believer and a non-believer can 
seem superficial to the former and frustrating to the latter.” (Hinde 1999: 35)
CONTEXT
For many scientists, whether or not they have any religious beliefs 
themselves, the relationships between science and religion, i.e. the 
‘science/religion issue’, may appear outside the scope of a serious science 
journal. However, a range of factors, including the continuing influence of 
creationism and the growing influence of intelligent design, suggests that this 
perspective may be too narrow. Here I begin by examining the nature of 
science and the nature of religion before looking at the ways in which science 
and religion relate to one another. I then look specifically at creationism in the 
light of what we know about evolutionary biology.
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
Readers of this journal are not likely to need a long treatment of the nature of 
science. However, my argument relies on some agreement as to the nature of 
science and any treatment of the science/religion issue surely requires an 
examination of both the nature of science and the nature of religion (Reiss, in 
press). I will highlight what I hope are a number of relatively uncontroversial 
points that are germane to the science/religion issue.
The phrase ‘the nature of science’ is used as a shorthand for something like 
‘how science is done and the sorts of things on which scientists work’. It 
therefore contains two elements: the practice of doing science and the 
knowledge that results.
It is difficult to come up with a definitive answer to the question ‘What do 
scientists study?’. Certain things clearly fall under the domain of science – the 
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nature of electricity, the arrangement of atoms into molecules, and 
mammalian physiology, to give three examples. However, what about the 
origin of the universe, the behaviour of people in society, decisions about 
whether we should build nuclear power plants or go for wind power, the 
appreciation of music and the nature of love, for example? Do these fall 
wholly under the domain of science? Although a small proportion of people, 
including a few prominent scientists, would not only argue ‘yes’ but maintain 
that all meaningful questions fall within the domain of science, most people 
hold that science is but one form of knowledge and that other forms of 
knowledge complement science.
This way of thinking means that the origin of the universe is also a 
philosophical or, for some, a religious question – or simply unknowable; the 
behaviour of people in society requires knowledge of the social sciences 
(including psychology and sociology) rather than only of the natural sciences; 
whether we should go for nuclear or wind power is partly a scientific issue but 
also requires an understanding of economics and risk, and even politics; the 
appreciation of music and the nature of love, while clearly having something 
to do with our perceptual apparatuses and our evolutionary history, cannot be 
entirely reduced to science (Reiss 2005).
While historians of science tell us that what scientists study changes over 
time, there are reasonable consistencies:
• Science is concerned with the natural world and with certain elements 
of the manufactured world – so that, for example, the laws of gravity 
apply as much to artificial satellites as they do to planets and stars.
• Science is concerned with how things are rather than with how they 
should be. So there is a science of gunpowder and in vitro fertilisation 
without science telling us whether warfare and test-tube births are good 
or bad.
If it is difficult to come up with a definitive answer to the question ‘What do 
scientists study?’ it is perhaps even more difficult to come up with a clear-cut 
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answer to the question ‘How is science done?’. Robert Merton characterised 
science as open-minded, universalist, disinterested and communal (Merton 
1973). For Merton, science is a group activity: even though certain scientists 
work on their own, all scientists contribute to a single body of knowledge 
accepted by the community of scientists. There are certain parallels here with 
art, literature and music. After all, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo and 
Raphael all contributed to Renaissance art. But while it makes no sense to try 
to combine their paintings, science is largely about combining the 
contributions of many different scientists to produce an overall coherent model 
of one aspect of reality. In this sense, science is disinterested; in this sense it 
is (or should be) impersonal. 
Of course, individual scientists, including evolutionary biologists, are 
passionate about their work and often slow to accept scientific challenges to 
accepted ideas. But science itself is not persuaded by such partiality. While 
there may be controversy about whether the paintings of Jackson Pollock or 
Francis Bacon are better (and the question is somewhat meaningless 
anyway), time invariably shows which of two alternative scientific theories is 
nearer the truth. For this reason, scientists are well advised to retain ‘open 
mindedness’, always being prepared to change their views in the light of new 
evidence or better explanatory theories, and science itself advances over 
time. As a result, while some scientific knowledge is contentious precisely 
because it has not yet achieved widespread acceptance within the scientific 
community, much scientific knowledge can confidently be relied on: it is 
relatively certain.
Karl Popper emphasised the falsifiability of scientific theories (Popper 
1934/1972): unless you can imagine collecting data that would allow you to 
refute a theory, the theory isn’t scientific. The same applies to scientific 
hypotheses. So, iconically, the hypothesis ‘All swans are white’ is scientific 
because we can imagine finding a bird that is manifestly a swan (in terms of 
its structure and behaviour) but is not white. Indeed, this is precisely what 
happened when early white explorers returned from Australia with tales of 
black swans.
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Popper’s ideas easily give rise to a view of science in which knowledge 
accumulates over time as new theories are proposed and new data collected 
to discriminate between conflicting theories. Much school and college 
experimentation in science is based on a Popperian view of scientific 
knowledge: we see a rainbow and hypothesise that white light is split up into 
light of different colours as it is refracted through a transparent medium (water 
droplets); we test this by attempting to refract white light through a glass 
prism; we find the same colours of the rainbow are produced and our 
hypothesis is confirmed. Until some new evidence causes it to be falsified, we 
accept it.
There is much of value in the work of Thomas Merton and Karl Popper, but 
most historians and philosophers of science would argue that there is more to 
the nature of science. Thomas Kuhn made a number of seminal contributions 
but he is most remembered nowadays by his argument that while the 
Popperian account of science holds well during periods of normal science 
when a single paradigm holds sway, such as the Ptolemaic model of the 
structure of the solar system (in which the Earth is at the centre) or the 
Newtonian understanding of motion and gravity, it breaks down when a 
scientific crisis occurs (Kuhn 1970). At the time of such a crisis, a scientific 
revolution happens during which a new paradigm, such as the Copernican 
model of the structure of the solar system or Einstein’s theory of relativity, 
begins to replace (following initial coexistence) the previously accepted 
paradigm. The central point is that the change of allegiance from scientists 
working within one paradigm to their working in another cannot, Kuhn argues, 
be fully explained by the Popperian account of falsifiability.
Kuhn likens the switch from one paradigm to another to a gestalt switch, when 
we suddenly see something in a new way. As Alan Chalmers puts it:
There will be no purely logical argument that demonstrates the 
superiority of one paradigm over another and that thereby compels a 
rational scientist to make the change. One reason why no such 
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demonstration is possible is the fact that a variety of factors are involved 
in a scientist’s judgment of the merits of a scientific theory. An individual 
scientist’s decision will depend on the priority he or she gives to the 
various factors. The factors will include such things as simplicity, the 
connection with some pressing social need, the ability to solve some 
specified kind of problem, and so on. Thus one scientist might be 
attracted to the Copernican theory because of the simplicity of certain 
mathematical features of it. Another might be attracted to it because in it 
there is the possibility of calendar reform. A third might have been 
deterred from adopting the Copernican theory because of an 
involvement with terrestrial mechanics and an awareness of the 
problems that the Copernican theory posed for it.
(Chalmers 1999: 115-116)
A useful development of Kuhn’s work was provided by Lakatos (1978) who 
argued that scientists work within research programmes. A research 
programme consists of a set of core beliefs surrounded by layers of less 
central beliefs. Scientists are willing to accept changes to these more 
peripheral beliefs so long as the core beliefs can be defended. So, in biology, 
we might see in contemporary genetics a core belief in the notion that 
development proceeds via a set of interactions between the actions of genes 
and the influences of the environment. At one point, it was thought that the 
passage from DNA to RNA was unidirectional. Now we know that this is not 
always the case. The core belief (that development proceeds via a set of 
interactions between the actions of genes and the influences of the 
environment) remains unchanged but the less central belief (that the passage 
from DNA to RNA is unidirectional) is abandoned.
The above account of the nature of science portrays science as what John 
Ziman (2000) has termed ‘academic science’. Ziman argues that such a 
portrayal was reasonably valid between about 1850 and 1950 in European 
and American universities but that since then we have entered a phase 
largely characterised by ‘post-academic science’. Post-academic science is 
increasingly transdisciplinary and utilitarian, with a requirement to produce 
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value for money; it is characterised by limits to the growth in the number of 
scientists; it is more influenced by politics; it is more industrialised; and it is 
more bureaucratic.
The effect of these changes is to make the boundaries around the city of 
science a bit fuzzier. It is not to deny that there is a city but to question the 
absoluteness of the distinction between city and countryside, between 
monarch and subject, between the judiciary and the executive. Of course, if 
one accepts the contributions of the social study of science (e.g., Yearley 
2005) one finds these boundaries fuzzier still.
THE NATURE OF RELIGION
There are many religions, which complicates answering the question 'What is 
the nature of religion?’. Nevertheless, the following, derived from Smart 
(1989) and Hinnells (1991), are generally characteristic of most religions.
First, religions have a practical and ritual dimension that encompasses such 
elements as worship, preaching, prayer, yoga, meditation and other 
approaches to stilling the self.
Secondly, the experiential and emotional dimension of religions has at one 
pole the rare visions given to some of the crucial figures in a religion's history, 
such as that of Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gita and the revelation to Moses at 
the burning bush in Exodus. At the other pole are the experiences and 
emotions of many religious adherents, whether a once-in-a-lifetime 
apprehension of the transcendent or a more frequent feeling of the presence 
of God either in corporate worship or in the stillness of one's heart.
Thirdly, all religions hand down, whether orally or in writing, vital stories that 
comprise the narrative or mythic dimension, for example the story of the six 
day creation in the Judaeo-Christian scriptures. For some religious adherents 
such stories are believed literally, for others they are understood symbolically.
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Fourthly, religions have a doctrinal and philosophical dimension that arises, in 
part, from the narrative/mythic dimension as theologians within a religion 
struggle to integrate these stories into a more general view of the world. Thus 
the early Christian church came to its understanding of the doctrine of the 
Trinity by combining the central truth of the Jewish religion – that there is but 
one God – with its understanding of the life and teaching of Jesus Christ and 
the working of the Holy Spirit.
If doctrine attempts to define the beliefs of a community of believers, the fifth 
dimension, the ethical and legal dimension, regulates how believers act. So 
Sunni Islam has its Five Pillars – Shahada (testimony of faith), Salat (prayer), 
Zakat (alms-giving), Sawm (fasting) and Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) – while 
Judaism has the Ten Commandments and other regulations in the Torah and 
Buddhism its Five Precepts.
Sixthly, the social and institutional dimension of a religion relates to its 
corporate manifestation, for example the Sangha (the order of monks and 
nuns founded by the Buddha to carry on the teaching of the Dharma in 
Buddhism), the umma' (the whole Muslim community) in Islam, and the 
Church (the communion of believers comprising the body of Christ) in 
Christianity.
Finally, there is the material dimension to each religion, namely the fruits of 
religious belief as shown by places of worship (e.g., synagogues, temples and 
churches), religious artefacts (e.g., Eastern Orthodox icons and Hindu 
statues) and sites of special meaning (e.g., the river Ganges, Mount Fuji and 
Eyre's Rock).
It is clear that there can be a number of axes on which the science/religion 
issue can be examined. For example, the effects of the practical and ritual 
dimension are being investigated by scientific studies that examine such 
things as the efficacy of prayer and the neurological consequences of 
meditation (e.g., Lee and Newberg 2005); a number of analyses of religious 
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faith, informed by contemporary understandings of evolutionary psychology, 
behavioural ecology and sociobiology, examine the possibility or conclude 
that religious faith can be explained by science (e.g., Reynolds and Tanner 
1983; Hinde 1999; Dennett 2006); the narrative/mythic dimension of religion 
clearly connects with scientific accounts of such matters as the origins of the 
cosmos and the evolution of life; the doctrinal and philosophical dimension 
can lead to understandings that may agree or disagree with standard scientific 
ones (e.g., about the status of the human embryo); and the ethical and legal 
dimension can lead to firm views about such matters as land ownership, usury 
and euthanasia. Perhaps only the social and institutional and the material 
dimensions of religion are relatively distinct from the world of science 
(understood, once again, as the natural sciences rather than more broadly).
As will be discussed in the next section, the relationship between science and 
religion has changed over the years (Brooke 1991; Al-Hayani 2005; 
Szerszynski 2005); indeed, the use of the singular, ‘relationship’, risks giving 
the impression that there is only one way in which the two relate. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that there are two key issues: one is to do with 
understandings of reality; the other to do with evidence and authority. 
Although it is always desperately difficult to generalise, most religions hold 
that reality consists of more than the objective world and many religions give 
weight to personal and/or (depending on the religion) institutional authority in 
a way that science generally strives not to do. For example, there is a very 
large religious and theological literature on the world to come, i.e. life after 
death, (e.g., Hick 1976/1985). However, to labour the point, science, strictly 
speaking, has little or nothing to say about this question, while many religious 
believers within a particular religion are likely to find the pronouncements on 
the question of even the most intelligent and spiritual of their present leaders 
to be of less significance than a few recorded words of their religion’s 
founder(s).
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION
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There is now a very large literature on the relationship between science and 
religion. Indeed, the journal Zygon specialises in this area (see also Science 
& Christian Belief, amongst others). A frequent criticism by those who write in 
this area (e.g., Roszak 1994) is of what they see as simplistic analyses of the 
area by those, often renowned scientists, who write occasionally about it. 
Indeed, it is frequently argued that the clergy both in the past and nowadays 
are often far more sympathetic to a standard scientific view on such matters 
as evolution than might be supposed (e.g., Colburn and Henriques 2006).
A particularly thorough historical study of the relationship between science 
and religion is provided by John Hedley Brooke (1991). Brooke’s aim is “to 
reveal something of the complexity of the relationship between science and 
religion as they have interacted in the past” (p.321). He concludes:
Popular generalizations about that relationship, whether couched in 
terms of war or peace, simply do not stand up to serious investigation. 
There is no such thing as the relationship between science and religion. 
It is what different individuals and communities have made of it in a 
plethora of different contexts. Not only has the problematic interface 
between them shifted over time, but there is also a high degree of 
artificiality in abstracting the science and the religion of earlier centuries 
to see how they were related.
(Brooke, 1991: 321)
Perhaps the best known categorisation of the ways in which the relationship 
between science and religion can be understood is provided by Ian Barbour 
(1990). Barbour, who focuses especially on epistemological assumptions of 
recent Western authors, identifies four main groupings.
First, there is the relationship of conflict; ‘first’ simply because it is the first in 
Barbour’s list and first, perhaps, also in the minds of many modernists who do 
not have a religious faith. Barbour does not give a reason for the order of his 
listing but at least two can be suggested: comprehensibility and familiarity. It is 
both easy and familiar (given Barbour’s declared focus on recent Western 
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authors) to see the relationship between science and religion as one of 
conflict. However, Barbour sees limitations in this way of understanding the 
science/religion issue. As he memorably puts it:
In a fight between a boa constrictor and a wart-hog, the victor, whichever 
it is, swallows the vanquished. In scientific materialism, science swallows 
religion. In biblical literalism, religion swallows science. The fight can be 
avoided if they occupy separate territories or if, as I will suggest, they 
each pursue more appropriate diets.
(Barbour 1990: 4)
Barbour’s second grouping is independence (e.g., Gould 1999). Science and 
religion may be seen as independent for two main reasons: because they use 
distinctive methods or because they function as different languages. In any 
event, the result is that each is seen as distinct from the other and as enjoying 
its own autonomy:
Each has its own distinctive domain and its characteristic methods that 
can be justified on its own terms. Proponents of this view say there are 
two jurisdictions and each party must keep off the other’s turf. Each must 
tend to its own business and not meddle in the affairs of the others. Each 
mode of inquiry is selective and has its limitations.
(Barbour 1990: 10)
Barbour’s third grouping moves beyond conflict and independence to 
dialogue (cf. Berry 1988; Watts 1998; Williams 2001; Polkinghorne 2005). As 
an example of dialogue, Barbour points out how our understanding of 
astronomy has forced us to ask why the initial conditions were present that 
allowed the universe to evolve. The point is not that the findings of science 
require a religious faith – that would be for the wart-hog of religion to swallow 
the boa constrictor of science. Rather the point is that scientific advances can 
give rise (no claim is made that they do for all people) to religious questions, 
so that a dialogue ensues.
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Barbour’s final grouping is one in which the relationship between science and 
religion is seen to be one of integration (cf. Polkinghorne 1994; Peacocke 
2001). For example, in natural theology it is held that the existence of God 
can be deduced from aspects of nature rather than from revelation or religious 
experience (e.g., Ray 1691/2005). Natural theology has rather fallen out of 
favour (but see Polkinghorne 2006). A more modern version is process 
theology which rejects a view of the world in which purely natural events 
(characterised by an absence of divine activity) are interspersed with 
occasional gaps where God acts. Rather, for process theologians, every 
event is understood “to be jointly the product of the entity’s past, its own 
action, and the action of God” (Barbour 1990: 29). Furthermore, God is not 
the Unmoved Mover of Thomas Aquinas but instead acts reciprocally with the 
world.
EVOLUTION, CREATIONISM AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN
As the above indicates, a considerable range of relationships between 
evolutionary biology and religion can be envisaged (e.g. Attfield 2006; Grigg 
2008; Southgate 2008). However, for reasons that delight some, appall others 
and bemuse many, belief in creationism persists while acceptance of 
intelligent design is growing in extent and influence in a number of countries 
(Jones and Reiss 2007; Williams 2008). Definitions of creationism vary but 
about 10% to 40% of adults in those countries where reliable data have been 
obtained, including many of the countries with the highest levels of religious 
non-belief, believe that the Earth is only some 10,000 years old, that it came 
into existence as described in the early parts of the Bible or the Qur’an and 
that the most that evolution has done is to change species into closely related 
species (see Miller et al. (2006) and enter “creationism evolution poll” into a 
Search Engine).
This understanding of creationism is best described as young-Earth 
creationism as other versions (including old-Earth creationism and 
progressive creationism) exist (Numbers, 2006). However, although hard data 
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are in short supply, it is clear that the creationism movement is clearly 
currently dominated by young-Earth creationists. Creationism, of whatever 
sort, is not the same as the belief that there is a creator. Many people hold 
that the world has such a creator without being creationists. For a creationist it 
is possible that the various species of zebra had a common ancestor but this 
is not the case for zebras, bears and antelopes – still less for monkeys and 
humans, for birds and reptiles or for fish and fir trees.
Those who advocate intelligent design, a theory that has only really been 
around since the 1990s but has grown hugely in political influence since then, 
generally make no reference to the scriptures or a deity in their current 
arguments (though such references do occur in earlier writings – e.g. 
Dembski (1999)) but maintain that the intricacy of the order we see in the 
natural world, including at a sub-cellular level, provides strong evidence for 
the existence of an intelligence behind this. An undirected process, such as 
natural selection, is held to be inadequate (e.g., Behe 1996, 2003; Dembski, 
2003; Johnson 1999).
To an evolutionist, such as myself, albeit someone who is also a priest in the 
Church of England, the Earth is some 4600 million years old and all 
organisms share a common ancestor. Indeed, if you go back far enough, life 
had its ancestry in inorganic molecules. Furthermore, an evolutionary 
understanding of the world is fundamental to biology and many other aspects 
of science. For an evolutionist, understanding of ourselves, the other 
organisms and the world about us requires an evolutionary perspective (Ayala 
2006).
Most of the literature on creationism (and/or intelligent design) and 
evolutionary theory puts them in stark opposition. Of course, even before the 
advent of intelligent design, there were non-creationist accounts that 
attempted to disprove Darwinism (e.g., Macbeth 1974; Hitching 1982). From 
the creationist camp, there are a huge number of books and a number of 
journals devoted to extolling creationism and execrating evolution. It is easy 
for scientists, perhaps especially those with no religious faith, to ignore or 
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dismiss such views as worthless but it is important to recognise the vigour 
with which they are held. After all, imagine you genuinely believed that the 
theory of evolution was not only factually incorrect but led to increased 
immorality and the loss of eternal salvation for anyone who believed it, 
wouldn’t you fight passionately against it? For an analysis by an academic 
psychologist of why creationism is here to stay see Evans (2000).
Evolution is consistently presented in creationist books and articles as illogical 
(natural selection cannot, on account of the second law of thermodynamics, 
create order out of disorder; mutations cannot lead to improvements), 
contradicted by the scientific evidence (e.g., the fossil record shows human 
footprints alongside animals supposed by evolutionists to be long extinct), the 
product of special pleading (the early history of life would require life to arise 
from inorganic matter – a form of spontaneous generation; radioactive dating 
makes huge assumptions about the constancy of natural processes over 
aeons of time), the product of those who ridicule the word of God and a cause 
of a number of social evils (eugenics, Marxism, Nazism, racism) – e.g., 
Heinze (1973), Hall and Hall (1975), Watson (1975), White (1978), Hayward 
(1985), Baker (2003) and articles too many to mention in the journals and 
other publications of the Biblical Creation Society, the Creation Science 
Movement and other like-minded organisations.
By and large, of course, creationism has received similarly short shrift from 
those who accept the theory of evolution. In a fairly early study the 
philosopher of science Philip Kitcher argued that “in attacking the methods of 
evolutionary biology, Creationists are actually criticizing methods that are 
used throughout science” (Kitcher 1982: 4-5). He concluded that the flat-earth 
theory, the chemistry of the four elements, and mediaeval astrology “have just 
as much claim to rival current scientific views as Creationism does to 
challenge evolutionary biology” (Kitcher 1982: 5).
A more trenchant attack on creationism was provided by geologist Ian 
Plimmer whose book title Telling Lies for God: Reason vs Creationism 
(Plimmer 1994) accurately sums up the line he takes. An historical and 
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philosophical analysis is provided by Michael Ruse (and see Numbers and 
Stenhouse 2000) who, while passionately critiquing creationism and 
defending evolution, is acerbic about those evolutionists who deride all 
religious belief and those theologians who are attracted to non-Darwinian 
understandings of life:
And given the threat that creationists pose to evolutionists of all kinds, it 
behooves evolutionists especially to start thinking about working 
together with Christian evolutionists, rather than apart. For a start, 
atheists like Dawkins and Coyne might consider taking a serious look at 
contemporary Christian theology (or the theology of other faiths, for that 
matter), rather than simply parroting the simplistic, schoolboy travesties 
of religion on which their critiques are founded. Conversely, Christians 
like Ward and Rolston might be encouraged to dig more deeply into 
modern, professional evolutionary biology and to start to get some 
understanding of its strengths and triumphs before they cast around for 
alternatives like self-organization.
(Ruse 2005: 274)
Many scientists and others have defended evolutionary biology from 
creationism – see, for example, Pennock (1999), Dawkins (2006), the various 
contributions in Manson (2003) and Jones and Reiss (2007) and an 
increasing number of agreed statements by scientists on the teaching of 
evolution (e.g., Interacademy Panel on International Issues 2006). The main 
points that are frequently made are that evolutionary biology is good science 
in that not all science consists of controlled experiments where the results can 
be collected within a short period of time; that creationism (including ‘scientific 
creationism’) isn’t really a science in that its ultimate authority is scriptural and 
theological rather than the evidence obtained from the natural world; and that 
an acceptance of evolution is fully compatible with a religious faith, an 
assertion most often made in relation to Christianity (e.g., Southgate et al. 
2005) since it is more obviously true of many other religions – including 
Hinduism, Buddhism and Judaism – and rather less true of Islam (Mabud 
1991; Negus 2005). For USA data about scientists’ religious beliefs at 
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different times see Larson and Witham (1999).
DEALING WITH CREATIONISM AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN THE 
BIOLOGY CLASSROOM, LECTURE THEATER OR LAB
How should a biology educator deal with students who reject the scientific 
theory of evolution, believing instead in one of the forms of creationism or 
intelligent design? We know that such students are typically strongly resistant 
to attempts to persuade them that their views are mistaken and that the 
scientific perspective is the valid one. For example, in their assessment of a 
first-year evolution course taken by undergraduates at the University of Cape 
Town, South Africa, Chinsamy and Plagányi (2007) found no statistically 
significant changes in the views of students as a result of the course for 
questions that challenged religious views about creation, biodiversity, and 
intelligent design and concluded “Our study confirms the results of previous 
studies that adults’ views on evolution are remarkably impervious to 
instruction” (p. 252).
In a number of writings, David Jackson and Lee Meadows jointly (Jackson et 
al., 1995) and separately (Jackson 2007; Meadows 2007) have described 
what it is like for students from conservative religious backgrounds to be faced 
with teaching about evolution in biology classrooms. Such students not only 
resist the teaching they receive but may feel threatened by it. This state of 
mind is usefully encapsulated by the term ‘worldview’. As Gauch (in press), in 
the lead paper in a special issue on ‘Science, worldviews, and education’ in 
the journal Science & Education, puts it, drawing on early definitions, “A 
worldview constitutes an overall perspective on life that sums up what we 
know about the world, how we evaluate it emotionally, and how we respond to 
it volitionally”. A value of the worldview perspective is that it indicates the 
extent to which a belief in creationism or intelligent design for many students 
is not just a simple misconception to be remedied by some straightforward 
science teaching, as a belief that most of the mass of a plant comes from 
material extracted from soil might be, but rather a whole way of understanding 
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the world – a ‘world view’.
Accepting the worldview perspective does not mean that the biology teacher 
should shrink from presenting the evidence for evolution. However, it does 
help us appreciate why such teaching may not be as successful as we would 
hope. As the official English government advice on teaching about science, 
given the existence of creationism and intelligent design, puts it:
Some students do hold creationist beliefs or believe in the arguments 
of the intelligent design movement and/or have parents/carers who 
accept such views. If either is brought up in a science lesson it should 
be handled in a way that is respectful of students’ views, religious and 
otherwise, whilst clearly giving the message that the theory of evolution 
and the notion of an old Earth / universe are supported by a mass of 
evidence and fully accepted by the scientific community.
(DCSF 2007)
I do believe in taking seriously and respectfully the concerns of students who 
do not accept the theory of evolution while still introducing them to it. While it 
is unlikely that this will help students who have a conflict between science and 
their religious beliefs to resolve the conflict, good science teaching can help 
students to manage it – and to learn more science. Creationism can profitably 
be seen not as a simple misconception that careful science teaching can 
correct. Rather, a student who believes in creationism can be seen as 
inhabiting a non-scientific worldview, which is a very different way of seeing 
the world. One rarely changes one’s worldview as a result of formal teaching, 
however well one is taught.
My hope, rather, is simply to enable students to understand the scientific 
worldview with respect to origins, not necessarily to accept it. We can help 
students to find their science lessons interesting and intellectually challenging 
without their being threatening. Effective teaching in this area can not only 
help students learn about the theory of evolution but better appreciate the way 
science is done, the procedures by which scientific knowledge accumulates, 
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the limitations of science and the ways in which scientific knowledge differs 
from other forms of knowledge.
CONCLUSION
My experience of having taught evolutionary biology for many years to biology 
undergraduates, those training to be teachers and others is that there are 
more creationist students in universities than is sometimes realised. I do not 
think that teaching about evolutionary biology is likely to cause many 
creationists to abandon their views. Instead, creationism can perhaps most 
profitably be seen as a ‘worldview’ that isn’t straightforwardly susceptible to 
scientific refutation. What, though, good teaching in this area can do can do is 
to enable creationists to get a better understanding of evolutionary biology 
and to appreciate how biological knowledge, including knowledge of 
evolutionary biology, builds up. Nothing is to be gained by ignoring or 
ridiculing those who have creationist beliefs.
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